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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the effects of a wage restraint policy 
on flows on the labour market. We distinguish flows into 
and out of employment and consider simple models for these 
flows. We find that the wage costs particularly affect the 
flow of employment into unemployment, which can be 
considered as a measure of job destruction, whereas it has 
no effect on the number of new hires, which can be 
considered as a measure of job creation. Therefore, wage 
moderation has preserved jobs that would otherwise have 
been destroyed. The inflow of new hires is influenced by 
investments, the generosity of the social benefit system 
and by structural mismatch. Apart from wage costs, also 
interest costs of firms play a role in the job destruction 
process, particularly since the beginning of the 1980's. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper adopts the flow approach to the labour market to identify the 
factors that determine the inflow in and the outflow from employment in The 
Netherlands between 1959 and 1991. A common feature in the pattern of 
employment in many industrialized economies is a slowdown in growth during 
the recession of 1974-75 and a considerable decline due to the recession of 
1981-82. From the second half of the 1980's employment increased again, both 
in persons and in labour years. In The Netherlands, this increase in employ-
ment was quite substantial, compared to other EC-countries. See, e.g., 
OEGD (1989,1991). It is argued that this excellent employment performance was 
the result of a maintained policy of wage restraint throughout the 1980's. 
Cf. CPB (1991) and Den Butter (1991). 
Traditional studies and models of the labour market, on which the above 
results are based, focus on stocks, i.e., employment, unemployment and labour 
supply. The flow approach to labour markets, which has recently gained 
momentum due to Blanchard and Diamond (1990,1992) among others, concentrates 
on flows of workers between these stocks. Usually, attention is paid to flows 
into and out of unemployment, as set out by Nickell (1982) and elaborated in 
Pissarides (1990). In this paper, however, we distinguish flows into and out 
of employment. 
The flow of workers out of employment is composed of outflow into 
unemployment and outflow into non-participation, notably disability, (early) 
retirement and death. Given this total gross outflow from employment and the 
net change in employment, we can easily derive the gross inflow into employ-
ment, i.e., excluding workers who change jobs. Hence, in this paper employ-
ment growth is decomposed into its 'building blocks', gross employment inflow 
and gross employment outflow. These flows differ from flows of job creation 
and job destruction. Cf. Davis and Haltiwanger (1990,1993). However, it does 
seem reasonable to use the flow from employment into unemployment, hence the 
number of layoffs, as an approximation of job destruction and the inflow of 
new workers as a proxy for job creation. Cf. Den Butter and Broersma (1993). 
We find that the policy of wage restraint in The Netherlands, represented 
by the labour income share, has particularly affected the outflow out of 
employment into unemployment. Hence, it has preserved jobs that would 
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otherwise have been destroyed. We also find that, especially since the early 
1980's, the interest costs of firms played a role in the outflow into 
Tinemployment. Apparently, rising interest costs leads to the destrnction of 
more jobs. Cf. Broersma (1992). Wage costs do however not seem to have a 
significant impact on the inflow of new workers. This inflow is more affected 
by investments, which in their turn are based on business prospects and sales 
expectations. Also the generosity of the social security system influences 
the inflow into employment. If the opportunity costs of being unemployed are 
low, unemployed persons are less inclined to search for jobs and hence the 
number of new hires is lower as well. Finally, also mismatch on regional 
labour markets appears to affect inflow into employment. 
This paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss the various flows 
on the Dutch labour market in section 2. Section 3 is concerned with the 
theoretical background of these flows and section 4 presents some estimation 
and test results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2. FLOWS ON THE DUTCH LABOUR MARKET 
We first of all have to identify the labour market flows that we consider to 
be essential to study the effects of a policy of wage restraint. We will 
concentrate on the flow of persons moving out of and into employment. Hence, 
we abstract from flows within employment, i.e., job-to-job movement, flows 
from unemployment to non-participation and vice versa. In figure 1, we 
sketch these relevant flows. 
UNEMPLOYMENT NON-PARTICIPATION 
V 
«. 
e u 1 u e 
EMPLOYMENT 
Figure 1. Flows out of and into employment. 
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Data on the outflow of employment into unemployment (Feu), disability 
(^ ed)> early and normal retirement (Feer and Fer) and the mortality rate 
among workers (Fem) are available. Hence, it is easy to construct the inflow 
into employment {Fin) from the total outflow out of employment (Fout), which 
is composed of outflow to both unemployment (Feu) and non-participation 
{Fen = Fed+Feer+Fer+Fem), and the net change in employment AE, or 
AE = ^n - Fout, (1) 
where A is the difference operator, Axt = xt-xt_v Equation (1) gives the gross 
inflow into employment or, in other words, the amount of new hires. Notice 
that we abstract from voluntary outflow of employment into non-participation, 
which can be assumed to be small. For more details, we refer to the Appendix. 
The levels of these flows into an out of employment for the period 
1959-1991, are depicted in figure 2 and their mam statistical characteris-
tics are given in table 1. 
Table 1. Characteristics of stock and flow series (1959-1991). 
Mean Standard deviation Maximum Minimum 
Employment 4193273 414488 5160000 3472000 
Inflow 405458 133497 729033 200125 
Outflow 352428 116886 532901 148125 
In general, two features of these flows are noteworthy. First, their size 
is large, compared to the net change in employment. Both inflow and outflow 
amount to some 10 percent of the level of employment, whereas the net change 
lies on average between 1 and 2 percent of the level of employment. The gross 
flows are about ten times larger! Thus, the Dutch labour market is character-
ized by large flows of workers into and out of employment. The actual gross 
flows are even larger, as we cannot take account of workers moving in and out 
of employment within one year. Loosely speaking, there might also be high 
rates of job creation and job destruction, as was also noted by Blanchard and 
Diamond (1990) in a study of worker flows on the U.S. labour market. 
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Second, it is clear that The Netherlands have experienced an almost 
contimiing increase in employment, from 3.5 million persons in 1960 to more 
than 5 million in the 1990's. Only in 1972, 1975 and 1983, employment 
actually feil. Over the same period, the inflow and outflow varied substanti-
ally. In the first half of the 1960's inflow was much higher than outflow and 
hence employment increased. Notice that due to the recession of 1967 inflow 
and outflow were approximately equal. The 1968 peak in both inflow and 
outflow was caused by the introduction of the disability act for employees 
(WAO). In the 1970's and 80's inflow and outflow moved closer together, with 
notable exceptions in 1979-1980 and 1986-88, when inflow rosé much steeper 
than outflow and hence employment increased. It was especially this increase 
in employment that was attributed to the continued policy of wage restraint 
that was upheld in the Netherlands from the early 1980's onwards. Notice that 
this sharp increase in employment in the second half of the 1980's was caused 
in part by an increase in the number of persons working part-time. In the 
sequel we will identify explanatory variables for these two flow series and 
we will model their effect. 
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Following definition (1), the employment level in period t + 1, Et+1, equals 
employment in the previous period, Et, plus the number of hires, Fin, minus 
the number of persons leaving employment, F ^ . Of the latter flow, we assume 
only the flow into unemployment to be determined by economie circumstances. 
Throughout the paper we abstract from job-to-job movement. Hence, the inflow 
of new workers or the hires and the flow of worker into unemployment or the 
layoffs are determined by 
Fin = hü, (2) 
Feu = IE, (3) 
where U is the number of unemployed, h is the hiring rate and / is the layoff 
rate. 
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Our theoretical considerations are inspired by the main assumptions of 
traditional matching and equilibrium flow models, as developed by Holt (1970) 
and Nickell (1982) and elaborated by Pissarides (1990). We assume that only 
Tinemployed persons engage in search for a job. Hence, we abstract from the 
role of employed job searchers. Burgess (1993) investigates the possibility 
of competition between employed and unemployed job searchers. Broersma (1993) 
also found substantial influence of such competition on the outflow out of 
unemployment in The Netherlands. The effect of job-to-job movement on 
employment is studied by Hassink and Broersma (1993). 
Furthermore, we assume imperfect information when unemployed search for 
the 'best' job and employers search for the 'best' worker. When these two 
find each other, a successful match may take place when the vacancy is filled 
by the job seeker, which thus results in a new hire. Finally, we also assume 
that the flows of workers across various states are generated by random 
shocks that affect the firm in a positive (opening of a new vacancy) or in a 
negative way (layoffs). These shocks are distributed around a zero mean and 
constant variance. Various structural shifts can be incorporated in this 
concept, like the one introduced by Lilien (1982), inducing larger flows of 
workers, i.e., more hires and layoffs each period. However, at the same time 
this not necessarily implies an increase in the number of successful matches. 
For instance, firms may require different skills than the ones offered by 
laid off workers. The same applies when jobs are offered in one region, but 
job seekers are in another and both are unwilling or unable to meet. This 
means that mismatch can generate an asymmetrie impact of structural shifts on 
the size of Fin and Feu and may thus lead to higher unemployment. 
Hires 
Based on these arguments, we can write the hiring rate h and the layoff 
rate / as functions of a vector of explanatory variables. The hiring rate h 
is the product of the job offer rate by firms, ö, and the job acceptance rate 
of unemployed, p. Hence, 
h = 8p. (4) 
We relax the equilibrium flow assumption and do allow for disequilibrium 
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situations in this setting. This implies that we no longer assume constant 
demand, a constant composition of the labour force and constant characteris-
tics of vacancies and unemployed, i.e., a constant level of mismatch. We now 
identify variables that determine 9 and p. 
The number of jobs a firm offers are connected to the desired level of 
employment the firm wants attain. This desired level of employment depends on 
relative prices, (technology) shocks, expections and the like, as was argued 
by Nickell (1986). We assume that the number of jobs offered are determined 
by the overall level of costs incurred by the firm; especially the costs 
involved in filling and maintaining this job. We assume these costs to 
consist mainly of labour costs, but also interest costs on debts may be 
important, to create and maintain a job. 
On the other hand, the actual and prospective business performance of the 
firm is another important determinant for offering a job. If the firm wants 
to prepare for expectations of a buoyant market, then it may offer more jobs. 
We simply assume that these prospects and expectations are associated with 
current aggregate demand. This demand may come from households and other 
firms and it may come from the home market or from abroad. Aggregate demand 
therefore includes consumption, investments and terms of trade. 
The inclusion of investments may pose a problem at the micro level, since 
it is connected with the other production factor, capital. A relation between 
job offers and capital depends on the functional form of the production 
function. In case of fixed coefficients ex post, an increase in capital 
yields an increase in labour, or more job offers. In macroeconomics, on the 
other hand, investments are often associated with expectations. According to 
Standard Keynesian reasoning, an increase in investments is seen as a major 
cause for boosting employment. 
Finally, we have to include variables that represent changes in the 
composition of the labour force and changes in characteristics of unemployed 
and vacancies, that may be associated with a change in equilibrium flows or a 
situation of disequilibrium. For this reason, we also include the Lilien-
index of structural change in the sectoral employment growth, ss, and a 
regional mismatch indicator, mm. Hence, 
6 = 0(c,ad,ss,mm), (5) 
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where c is the cost level, which consists of labour and interest costs, and 
ad stands for aggregate demand. 
The job acceptance rate p depends on the replacement rate, as a measure 
of the opportunity costs of being unemployed., 
P = P(rr). (6) 
Combining (5) and (6) and taking logarithms yields the hiring rate, 
log/i = log 9(c, ad, ss, mm) + logp(rr). (7) 
Layoffs 
We use Burgess and Nickell (1990) to find a specification for the layoff 
rate. The decision to layoff a person is based on some planning on the part 
of the firm. The firm plans to employ a certain number of workers each 
period. If the firm is struck by a negative shock, this may imply a revision 
of the employment plan and may thus result in laying off a number of workers. 
As mention earlier, we abstract from voluntary quits. 
The number of persons a firm wants to layoff is equal to the difference 
between actual and planned employment. Thus the layoff rate / can be written 
as a function of planned employment Ep, 
l = l(Ep). 
Planned employment is based on profit maximizing behaviour of the firm, as 
set out in Nickell (1986). It typically depends on variables like the 
relative cost level of the firm, in particular the labour costs, but also the 
interest payments of debts, aggregate demand, and a set of variables repre-
senting the state of the labour market. Cf. Burgess and Nickell (1990). We 
approximate the latter by the index of structural change in the composition 
of the labour force ss. Thus, the layoff rate /, written in logarithms, is 
specified as 
log/ = logl(c,ad,ss). (9) 
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•4. DATA 
This section briefly discusses some of the data used below. Details of the 
definitions and sources are given in the Appendix. We start with the hiring 
rate h, which is defined as the inflow into employment Fin, normalized by the 
beginning of the year unemployment stock. Since it exceeds unity it cannot be 
interpreted as a probability. The unemployment data refer to the beginning of 
the year, so it is a predetermined variable. 
The layoff rate is given by the outflow of persons from employment to 
unemployment, Feu, normalized by the employment stock of the beginning of the 
year. The cost variable, c, is composed of labour costs, for which we take 
the labour income share, and interest costs, for which we take the interest 
share. Cf. Appendix. Investments i are the real investments in fixed capital. 
The replacement rate was calculated as the ratio of the unemployment 
insurance benefit and the net industrial wages. 
Structural change in the composition of the labour force is represented 
by the Lilien-index for structural shifts in growth rates of sectoral 
employment. Regional mismatch is represented by the sum of the absolute value 
of the residuals of a regression of unemployment on a constant and the 
vacancies for each Dutch province. 
4. ESTIMATION AND TEST RESULTS 
This section presents the estimation results of models (8) and (9). All 
variables involved are in logarithms. Our modelling strategy is to move from 
general to specific and to test the adequacy of our models with a number of 
misspecification tests. This general specification will then be simplified, 
by deleting variables with insignificant parameters. The validity of these 
simplifications are tested with a Standard F-test. 
Equations (8) and (9) can .easily be rewritten in error correction form 
and the presence of cointegration can be tested. 
Aloght = o^/Mog öt(c, ad, ss, mm) + oc2Alog pt(rr) + 
- y[\ogh - /?]log0(c,ad,ss,mm) - /?2tagP(™")]t-i (1°) 
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ALoglt = oc3Aloglt(c,ad,ss) - ó[logl - /?3log/(c, ad, s s ) ] ^ (11) 
A static regression of the long-term of (10) yields the Durbin-Watson 
test statistics on cointegration of 1.80. This rather high value has two 
implications. First, the presence of a long-term relation cannot be rejected. 
Second, this equation needs only little additional dynamics to be adequate. 
For the static regression of the long-term part of (11), we found a Durbin-
Watson statistic of 0.86, indicating that also here cointegration cannot be 
rejected. 
Next (10) and (11) were estimated and tested, where we also included a 
time trend in the models, since application of the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test showed that both dependent variables were trend stationary. Most of the 
other series were 1(1). The estimation and test results are given in table 2 
and 3, respectively, where only the simplified models are presented. 
We start the discussion with the model for the hiring rate in table 2. 
The F-test on parameter restrictions to test the validity of moving from the 
general specification to the model in the first column of table 2 is 
F(10,15) = 1.552. Hence, this simplification cannot be rejected. The model has 
two striking features. First, the value of the adjustment parameter y is 
close to minus unity. Second, the parameter values for the change in the 
replacement rate and the lagged replacement rate are of the same magnitude. 
This implies that the model of column 1 can be restricted to that in column 2 
with loght as dependent variable and log rrt as one of the explanatory 
variables. Diagnostic tests do not indicate that these models are severely 
misspecified. 
This model has the following implications. The hiring rate is not 
affected by the labour costs. Instead, investments play a prominent role. In 
their turn, investments may be determined by expectations and business 
prospects, on which labour costs may exert influence. Hence, if labour costs 
affect hiring of new workers, it is only indirectly so. In addition, the 
replacement rate has a negative impact on the hiring rate. If, however, we 
view the pattern of the recursively estimated parameter of the replacement 
rate, its influence became significant only from 1985 onwards. Apparently, 
the social benefit system was then perceived as generous by the unemployed, 
- 10 -
in relation to net wages, and consequently they were less inclined to accept 
a job offer. Hence, less new hires take place. Finally, also regional 
mismatch is important; the more unemployed are in the 'wrong' region, with 
respect to available vacancies, the less new hires are made. Inspection of 
the recursively estimated coëfficiënt of this variable revealed that its 
influence is declining over the period 1986-1991. This may imply that during 
the second half of the 1980's the immobility of unemployed decreased. 
Next, we turn to the models of table 3. The model in the first column is 
a valid simplification of the general specification (14). The F-test on 
parameter restrictions yields F( l l , 18) = 1.037. The labour costs appear to be 
the sole variable that affect the outflow of workers into unemployment. 
Hence, the higher the labour costs, the more jobs may be destroyed and hence 
the more workers are laid off. Notice that this mechanism is in accordance 
with the scrapping condition in the vintage model approach, adopted by the 
Dutch Central Planning Bureau. On the other hand, this also implies that the 
policy of wage restraint only affects the outflow into unemployment. More 
wage restraint then implies that less jobs are destroyed and hence less 
workers are made redundant. In other words, wage restraint leads to preserva-
tion of jobs that will otherwise be destroyed. 
Inspection of the recursively estimated coëfficiënt of the labour income 
share in figure 3, shows that its effect decreased significantly from 1979 
onwards. Notice that in this period the policy of wage restraint was also 
implemented and at the same time there was a huge inflow into unemployment, 
due to the recession of 1981-82. A reason for this decline may be the 
importance of the interest costs of firms, in relation to their employment 
plan. Cf. Broersma (1992). 
In the 1970's, when borrowing was cheap and many firms accumulated hüge 
debts. Production technologies became more and more capital intensive, 
necessitating higher investments, and hence more debts. When interest rates 
rosé in the early 1980's, a lot of firms faced increasing interest payments 
and bankruptcy. In its turn, this caused an increase in job destruction and 
hence an increase of the flow into unemployment. Therefore, it seems natural 
to include the interest costs on debts as explanatory variable in the model 
of the layoff rate. 
This is done in the second column of table 3, where the log of the 
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interest share was included in the error correction part of the model. 
Unfortunately, the interest costs of firms are avaüable only from 1977 
onwards, so the sample size is reduced to only 14 observations. In this case, 
the adjustment parameter 8 of the model is close to unity. Hence, the model 
can be restricted to that in column 3 with log/( as the dependent variable. 
The model shows that also interest costs on debts have a significant positive 
effect on the outflow of workers into unemployment. Increasing interest 
payments may raise the cost level of the firm in such a way that layoffs are 
the only option for the firm to survive. 
Since all variables in both tables are in logarithms, the coefficients 
equal the elasticities. An increase in real investment with one percentage 
point implies an increase in new hires of 2.6 percentage point. On the other 
hand, when considering the model in the third column of table 3, an increase 
in the labour income share of one percentage point raises the flow into 
unemployment with more than 4 percentage points. The elasticity of the 
interest share is much smaller. So a shock in the driving variables exerts a 
large impact on the hiring and layoff rate. The elasticities are larger 
compared to a model of the net change in employment, where the wage elastici-
ty is usually about -0.5. Cf. Den Butter (1991). Hence, the impact of the 
driving variables is much larger on the gross flows than on the net change in 
employment. Moreover, the driving variables differ in their impact on the 
gross flows, which cannot be distinguished when only the net change in 
employment is considered. Therefore, the flow approach to labour markets may 
provide a much richer framework for further research than the traditional 
stock approach. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have identified the flow series that make up the change in employment in 
the Netherlands from 1959 to 1991. The flow out of employment consists of 
persons moving into unemployment and persons moving into non-participation. 
We consider only the first flow to be dependent upon economie conditions. 
These two flows in combination with the net change in employment, yield the 
gross inflow into employment. The Dutch labour market is characterized by 
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huge gross flows into and out of employment. Hence, it is still characterized 
by very dynamic features. 
We have developed a tentative theory, based on the properties of Standard 
equilibrium flow and matching models, to pro vide an economie specification of 
our models for hiring and layoff rate. When these theories are tested, using 
annual data for the Netherlands, we find that the hiring rate is particularly 
determined by investments, whereas the layoff rate is affected by the labour 
costs. Furthermore, the replacement rate and regional mismatch also affect 
the hiring rate, but the effect of regional mismatch decreases over the 
sample, whereas the effect of the replacement rate has only recently become 
significantly different from zero. Finally, apart from the labour costs, also 
the interest costs of firms have a significant impact on the layoff rate. 
This represents the increasing importance of the financial structure of firms 
on their employment decisions. 
It has been asserted that the increase in employment in the second half 
of the 1980's, was mainly caused by the policy of wage restraint that was 
pursued by the Dutch authorities. We find that this wage restraint may only 
have led to the preservation of jobs that would otherwise have been scrapped. 
The creation of new jobs, which is closely connected to the inflow of new 
workers, is much more connected to business prospects and sales expectations. 
Since the employment growth in the period 1986-1988, was due to an exception-
ally high inflow of new workers, it is doubtful whether wage restraint alone 
was the major reason for this growth. High investments seem to have been a 
much more important factor. 
A policy to stimulate investment, or more general, to facilitate business 
conditions, may increase employment more than a policy of wage restraint 
only. The government should facilitate the creation of new jobs, which have a 
higher productivity and are more competitive, instead of preserving existing 
jobs, which have lower productivity and are less competitive. Job creation 
can be invoked by providing entrepreneurial incentives, good sales expecta-
tions, profitable business prospects and a flexible labour market. Finally, 
the results with this flow approach to labour markets shows the importance of 
analyzing gross labour market flows, instead of concentrating on stocks only. 
Cf. Den Butter and Broersma (1993). 
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Table 2. Estimation and test results of the hiring rate. 
dependent variable: Alog^JU^ logiHt/Uf^) 
13.43 
(18.54) 
-0.157 
(-15.46) 
constant 10.24 
(6.892) 
time -0.121 
(-6.626) 
Alog{rr)t -1.430 
(-2.337) 
log(#/t /- i) t- i -0.775 
(-6.617) 
l o g ( / / ^ ) t - i 2.039 
(6.584) 
log(rr) t_! -2.259 
(-7.378) 
logimm)^ -0.105 
(-2.403) 
log(rr) t 
R2 0.749 
S.E. 0.128 
T 33 
7 ^ ( 1 , 2 4 ) 0.171 
XAR(6) 6.65 
X&2) 0.572 
^AKC«(1)32) 0.111 
2.575 
(10.50) 
-0.142 
(-2.961) 
-2.561 
(-8.881) 
0.970 
0.146 
33 
^ ( 1 , 2 6 ) 1.237 
6.67 
1.348 
0.508 
The t-values are denoted in parentheses below the parameter values. The 
models include a dummy variable for the introduction of the WAO in 1968. R 
is the correlation coëfficiënt, S.E. is the residual Standard error, T is the 
number of observations available, Fj^ is the F-version of Godfrey's (1979) LM 
test on residual autocorrelation, which is particularly reliable in small 
samples (see, Kiviet 1986), XAR is t n e Ljung-Box (1978) test on residual 
autocorrelation, XN is t n e Jarque-Bera (1980) test on normally distributed 
residuals and FARCH is Engle's (1982) test on autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH). The test statistics indicate their distribution 
under the null hypothesis, including the appropriate degrees of freedom. 
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Table 3. Estimation and test results of the layoff ra te . 
dependent variable: Alog(FeUjt/Et.1) A\oZ(FeUttIEt_x) l o g ^ t / E n ) 
constant -1.715 -6.436 -5.217 
(-3.076) (-4.447) (-6.162) 
time 0.013 0.079 0.065 
(3.369) (4.312) (5.162) 
log(Fe a/£_1) t_1 -0.386 
(-3.911) 
-1.252 
(-5.140) 
log(fe) t-i 1.284 5.379 4.592 
(2.263) (4.065) (4.222) 
log(»**)t-i 1.141 
(3.662) 
0.914 
(4.105) 
R2 0.441 0.765 0.797 
S.E. 0.161 0.093 0.093 
T 33 14 14 
^ ( 1 , 2 8 ) 1.002 *UK(1 ,8) 1.995 /U*( l ,9) 1.232 
xH*(6) 7.79 5.19 5.20 
XN(2) 2.533 0.457 0.802 
fARC'#(1>32) 0.013 FARCHV-I 13) 0.001 0.148 
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Figure Z. Employment stock (left scale) and flo 
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DATA APPENDIX: SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS 
Abbreviations 
CBS Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Bureau of Statistics) 
CPB Centraal Planbureau (Central Planning Bureau) 
OECD Organization of Economie Cooperation and Development 
Definitions and sources 
Feu: flow out of employment into unemployment, due to firing. Or the 
inflow of persons in unemployment insurance (WW) (x 1000). 
source: Sociale Verzekeringsraad, Kroniek van de sociale verzekeringen, 
1992. 
Fed: flow out of employment into disability. Or the inflow of persons in 
disability insurance (WAO/AAW) (x 1000). 
source: Sociale Verzekeringsraad, Kroniek van de sociale verzekeringen, 
1992. 
Feer: flow out of employment into early retirement (VUT) (x 1000). 
source: CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek and author's calculations. 
Fer: flow out of employment into retirement (AOW) (x 1000) 
source: CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek. 
calculated as inflow retired persons = A(AOW) + deaths65+, 
where A(AOW) is the change in retired persons and deaths65+ is the number 
of deaths in the cohort 65 and older. This inflow was then multiplied 
with the participation rate of persons of 60-64 years old to give Fer. 
Fut: flow out of unemployment due to firing, into employment. Or the 
number of persons on an unemployment assurance benefit (WW) finding 
employment (x 1000). 
source: Sociale Verzekeringsraad, Kroniek van de sociale verzekeringen, 
1992. 
Fin: new hires from unemployment and non-participation, i.e., Fue+Fne, 
excluding hires of job-to-job movers (x 1000). 
source: calculated as Fin = AE+Feu + Fen, where Fen = Fed+Feer+Fer is the flow 
of employment into non-participation. 
E: employment, i.e., the number of employees (x 1000). 
source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics. 
U: unemployment in thousands of persons. 
source: CPB, Lange Reeksen. 
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labour costs, as percentage of the value added of firms. 
source: CPB, Lange Reeksen. 
Interest costs as percentage of value added of non-financial firms. 
source: CBS, Nationale Rekeningen (National Account Statistics). 
It is calculated as as rs —100% - Is - ps. Cf. Keus (1989). The profit 
share ps is based on the following entries of table SlO.1 of the Nationa-
le Rekeningen: entry 2116 minus the government share; entry 2117 minus 
the income of self-employed; entry 6310. 
aggregate demand, which is assumed to consist of a domestic and a 
foreign part, with real consumption, real investment and terms of 
trade. 
C: private consumption 
Pc: price deflator of consumption goods 
source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
I: investment in gross capital formation. 
P{. price deflator of investment goods. 
source: OECD, National Account Statistics and Main Economie Indicators. 
CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek. 
ttr: terms of trade (import price index over export price index). 
source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
Lilien's (1982) index for structural shifts for six sectors. 
This index is calculated as 
ss = {ZU(Eit/Et)[A\ogEit-AloëEt}2}/2 
source: CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek. 
replacement ratio, defined as the daily unemployment insurance 
benefit, times seven, divided by the average weekly net wages in 
industry. 
source: Sociale Verzekeringsraad, Kroniek van de sociale verzekeringen, 
1992. 
CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek. 
mismatch index for the eleven provinces in the Netherlands. 
This index is calculated as the absolute value of the forecasted 
error of the individual i/F-curves, hence 
Vit = <*o + <*ivit + £«, 
mm = Ei=1\£it\. 
source: CBS, Sociaal - economische maandstatistiek. 
CBS, Stastistisch Zakboek. 
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